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Introduction 
China’s market reforms since 1979 have resulted in dynamic capital accumulation 
with strong income growth. Growth, however, has been distributed unequally, while 
welfare rights and employment guarantees from the socialist period have been 
abandoned or weakened. And accumulation has gone hand in hand with oppressive 
exploitation, redundancies, land confiscation, discrimination, corruption and 
environmental degradation. Over the past five to ten years, central government has 
responded with social reform initiatives, but what are the chances of success? How 
are other actors likely to respond, and what potential is there for transformation?  
In order to identify the processes that have resulted in China’s inegalitarian 
model of accumulation, I will use the† examples of Taiwan and South Korea for 
comparative purposes. By relating China’s unequal model of accumulation to 
legacies from the Mao period and the unfolding of China’s market reforms that began 
in 1979, I will argue that local governments have responded to fiscal and budgetary 
decentralization with policies to promote capital accumulation. They have, however, 
also responded with illegal taxation and land confiscations. I further argue that the 
local governments’ promotion of capital accumulation has caused systemic 
overaccumulation and that the dark side of China’s economic miracle has given rise 
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to popular protest. In turn, central government has responded with reforms aimed at 
reducing inequality and improving welfare in order to dampen social unrest and 
change China’s model of accumulation. However, many of these reforms have been 
resisted by both local governments and business. In conclusion, I argue that the 
successful implementation of the equalizing reforms ‘from above’ requires the 
support of popular mobilization ‘from below’ and discuss recent trends in China’s 
labour relations to identify potential developments in this direction.  
 
Precedents and legacies from the Mao period 
From the late 1950s until the late 1970s, most land and means of production in 
China were publicly owned. Labour and land could not be bought or sold and market 
exchange and family labour were also restricted. The rural population was enrolled in 
collective production brigades, the urban population in work units (where 
employment was permanent). The work units controlled members’ consumption as 
well as production, and provided housing, healthcare, education and pensions 
(Andreas 2008: 126-127).  
Agriculture was treated as a source of revenue and cheap wage goods to be 
squeezed through compulsory sales to the state at low prices (Christiansen and 
Zhang 2009: 13). The government restricted migration within the country through a 
system of household registration (hukou) and the control of housing, food rationing 
and jobs. There were particularly severe restrictions on migration from the 
countryside to the cities. Urban workers in state-owned enterprises and public 
administration received nationally guaranteed wages and welfare. Workers in rural 
collective farms and enterprises received non-standardized wages and services that 
depended on local economic conditions, which were inferior to those in the cities 
(Lee and Selden 2008: 83-84). 
 Despite the strong urban bias, living conditions in the countryside improved 
during the Mao period. The government encouraged irrigation and new high-yielding 
rice varieties and fertilizers. Rural health and education was promoted. In 1980, 
China had remarkably high scores on life expectancy and adult literacy in relation to 
its low GDP per capita (Arrighi 2007: 371-372).  
 The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power through popular 
mobilization and the organization of mass associations of peasants, workers, women 
and youth. After the revolution in 1949, these organizations were subject to the one-
party state, serving in the main as transmission belts for government decrees. The 
labour union was first suppressed and then disbanded during the last decade of the 
Mao period (Unger and Chan 1996: 104). In general, non-state organizations were 
not allowed to operate independently of the CCP. 
 
Market reform, growth and distribution 
Chinese market reforms began in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, and 
administrative reform played an important role. Local control of the party state was 
limited to the self-contained people’s communes that had a high degree of economic 
self-sufficiency and were led by local cadres who combined administrative and 
economic power. The market reforms separated economic and ‘civilian’ administration 
within the collectives, while new economic zones merged the administration of cities 
with surrounding rural communities (Shue 1988: 106-118).  
The so-called ‘household responsibility system’ was introduced during 1979-
83, which enabled previously collective farmers to lease land from the collectives. In 
return for receiving usage rights to the land, the farmers had to sell grain quotas at 
administratively fixed prices. By the end of 1982, more than 90 per cent of China’s 
agricultural households had returned to household farming. (Naughton 2007: 120, 
240-241).  
The dismantling of collective farming undermined the health and education 
services that had previously been provided by rural collectives, leaving the rural 
population to cover new costs for schooling and healthcare. This in turn became an 
inducement to seek off-farm employment, particularly within the new and enlarged 
economic zones where farm household members found work in the rural township-
village enterprises (TVE) that emerged out of the previous rural collective enterprises 
(Naughton 2007: 243-246). A cheap, relatively well educated and healthy rural 
population was an asset for the TVEs, which were in a strong position to compete 
with the more regulated state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Rural industry was growing 
within the booming TVE sector. 
Chinese communists carried out revolutionary land reform during and after the 
Chinese civil war. They removed the landlord class and redistributed land equally. 
Their opponents in Taiwan and South Korea responded with ‘counter-revolutionary’ 
land reforms that also removed landlords and redistributed land. China collectivized 
agriculture from the mid-1950s, but after the introduction of the household 
responsibility system, China’s rural structure resembled those of South Korea and 
Taiwan. There was egalitarian, small-scale family farming in all three countries. 
Decentralized rural industrialization provided off-farm employment close to the farm 
both in Taiwan from the early 1960s and in China in the 1980s. In both countries, 
labour-intensive manufacturing went hand in hand with strong economic growth and 
egalitarian family farming. Similar patterns were found in South Korea, although with 
less decentralized and rural industrialization. Gillian Hart has coined the term 
‘accumulation without dispossession’ to underscore that these East Asian models of 
accumulation differ from the orthodox Marxist model, where ‘primitive accumulation’ 
with the separation of peasants from their land precedes capitalist industrialization 
(Hart 2002: 214-224). 
South Korea and Taiwan have combined strong economic growth with 
relatively equal income distribution. Their ‘growth with equity’ is normally associated 
with the equal distribution of land prior to industrialization. China’s development has, 
however, been characterized by strong economic growth and increased inequality 
despite similar rural structures. In 1980, the Gini coefficients of income distribution in 
China, South Korea and Taiwan were 0.32, 0.36 and 0.31 respectively. Income 
distribution in South Korea and Taiwan remained at similar levels during the next 
decades, while China had a Gini coefficient of 0.47 in 2005, on a par with the most 
unequal Asian countries (Hung 2008: 163).  
In the early 1980s, China appears to pursue growth with equity that reduced 
the large income disparities between the cities and the countryside. However, the 
ratio of urban-to-rural household incomes then declined from 2.5 in 1978 to 1.8 in 
1984. From 1985, the ratio began to rise again and has remained above 3.0 since 
2002 (Naughton 2007: 133). In contrast, urban-rural income distribution became 
more equal in Taiwan and South Korea during the 1970s. In South Korea for 
example, the ratio changed from 1.49 in 1970 to 1.05 in 1974 (Hung 2009: 12).  
Urban-rural equalization in Taiwan and South Korea came as a result of policy 
shifts. Previously, the government of Taiwan had monopolized the sale of fertilizers 
that were bartered against rice from the farms at terms of trade highly unfavourable 
to the farmers (Selden with Ka 1993), while South Korean authorities had neglected 
the countryside. In the early 1970s, both governments expanded public investment in 
rural development programmes, and Taiwan ended its rice-fertilizer barter system. 
The policy shifts came in response to problems of external security and domestic 
legitimacy. The USA’s commitment to the military protection of South Korea and 
Taiwan became more uncertain as the Nixon administration attempted to normalize 
relations with China. The domestic opposition in South Korea, and to a lesser extent 
Taiwan, became stronger and blamed the governments for the plight of the 
peasantries. Both governments responded with a number of new policies, including 
rural policies aimed at increasing self-sufficiency in food and improving legitimacy 
(Gold 1986: 106; Haggard and Moon, 1993: 74-75; Hung 2009: 12-13). 
In contrast, China’s urban bias persisted into the next century, after a brief 
interlude with relatively favourable agricultural policies with high procurement prices 
in the early 1980s. Unlike South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s, China’s security 
situation was stable. International relations with the United States improved in the 
early 1970s, and relations with the Soviet Union improved in the mid-1980s. Also, 
the domestic challenge from the Tiananmen Square student movement in 1989 had 
not included demands on behalf of the peasantry.  
Growing rural incomes and the scarcity of cheap rural ‘surplus labour’ pushed 
wages up in Taiwan and South Korea. From the late 1980s, their manufacturers 
began to relocate significant amounts of labour-intensive production to low-wage 
areas in East and Southeast Asia, including China. China’s rural surplus labour 
abounded through the 20th century and wage levels remained low.  
China developed free export zones (special economic zones) and ‘open 
economic regions’ along the coast before the full transition to a national, export-
oriented industrialization strategy was initiated in 1993. The export-led manufacturing 
of the 1990s was more concentrated in urban and coastal areas and created less 
employment than the import-substitution manufacturing of the 1980s. There was a 
surge in private sector production and services as restrictions on private enterprise 
were lifted in the late 1980s. In the second half of the 1990s, the Chinese authorities 
launched tough public enterprise reforms. China’s SOEs were gradually restructured 
from being dual-purpose business and welfare institutions to become profit-
maximizing enterprises.  
In 1988, a new bankruptcy law ended guaranteed lifetime employment. From 
the mid-1990s, SOEs received less support from the government controlled banks 
and many SOEs became financial burdens to the local governments that owned 
them. The 15th Communist Party Congress in September 1997 gave local 
governments a relatively free hand to let SOEs go bankrupt and privatize, 
corporatize, merge or downsize them. A large number of SOEs went bankrupt and 
were restructured or privatized along with thousands of TVEs that had served as 
their subcontractors. SOEs were permitted to abandon previous welfare 
commitments to their workers, which were replaced with much less comprehensive 
government welfare services (Naughton 2007: 105; Walker and Buck 2007: 43; 
Andreas 2008: 130-131). Manufacturing employment fell from 126 million by yearend 
1996 to 101 million by yearend 2002. During the same period, employment within 
wholesale and retail, construction and transportation increased from 99 million to 109 
million (National Bureau of Statistics 2005: table 5.6; Banister and Cook 2011: 41). 
This rise was not, however, sufficient to fully compensate for the decline in 
manufacturing employment. Millions became unemployed, while the informal sector 
was growing.  
In the 1990s, a large number of workers migrated to the cities to find 
employment, something that had previously been restricted by a food rationing 
system in which food coupons were reserved for households with urban hukou. At 
the end of the 1980s, this system was abandoned. In the early 1990s, employment 
growth of the rural TVEs slowed down and migration to the cities increased, and 
many urban governments restricted the use of migrant labour during the second half 
of the 1990s as urban unemployment increased, yet at the turn of the century labour 
migration to the cities rose swiftly (Li 2008: 4-5). In 1980 about seven million 
individuals were categorized as migrants, having lived at least six months in a county 
other than the county of their official household registration residence. This number 
increased to 22 million in 1990 and 79 million in 2000. The total number of migrants 
between and within counties was 144 million in 2000 (Liang and Ma 2004: 470, 476). 
By 2010, this number had increased to 221 million, 160 million of which were rural 
migrant workers (Xinhua, 1 March 2011).  
Most migrant workers were employed in the private sector, especially within 
manufacturing and construction. Their employment was typically short term, with low 
pay and dangerous and dirty work. Only a minority signed labour contracts with their 
employers. Migrant workers without permanent urban hukou were deprived of the 
welfare entitlements enjoyed by the registered urban population and those in public 
employment. Migrant children inherited their parents’ hukou and were unable to 
adopt urban welfare rights.1 Migrant workers were also segregated by the shifting 
durability of their temporary residential rights and varying degrees of civil and social 
rights. Right at the bottom were the so-called ‘ghost workers’ without documents, 
who were exposed to official abuse and evictions (Naughton 2007: 124-125; Li 2008: 
9, 14, 16; Wang 2010: 338; Wu 2010: 61-75).  
 
Decentralized governance: developmentalism and predation 
China’s growth with inequality has unfolded within a decentralized political order, 
where local administrations from provinces downward are under strong pressure to 
expand their revenue. In 1986, a system of ‘fiscal contracts’ with the SOEs stipulated 
their profit remittances to the central government, while they were allowed to retain 
the remainder and in 1988, a similar system was established between the central 
government and local governments (Wong and Bird 2008: 430-431). Financial 
responsibilities are also decentralized. Since 1994, central government’s share of 
total financial expenditure has only been about 30 per cent, while the remainder of 
the expenditure is distributed across four levels of local government and is reportedly 
the most decentralized budget in the world (Wong 2009: 77). Decentralization has 
strengthened the orientation to economic development goals in provinces, city 
municipalities, counties and townships.  
A new ‘cadre responsibility system’ was established in the early 1990s. Local 
government officials were assessed for bonuses and promotion, or fined, according 
to the results of their administration within areas such as industrial and agricultural 
development, tax collection, family planning and social order (So 2009: 54, 60). The 
primacy of economic development was further strengthened by the new Tax Sharing 
Scheme that was established in 1994 to redress the distribution of revenue between 
central and local governments. Local governments would have to manage the same 
tasks as they had previously while their share of the total revenue declined.  
Local governments were frequently in arrears on payments of wages, 
pensions and unemployment benefits after 1994. They tried to develop extra-
budgetary sources of revenue that were not included in the system of revenue 
sharing with higher levels of the government. These extra-budgetary revenues 
included legally retained earnings of public enterprises, as well as illicit revenue from 
extra fees and surcharges on public goods and services, expropriations, fines and 
bribes.  
Local governments developed and strengthened public corporations. They 
also saved to invest in infrastructure in the hope of boosting economic growth and 
revenue, while attempting to restrict public consumption. They controlled provincial 
and local branches of the state-owned banks that provide credits for state-owned 
enterprises. Competition between local governments is a major source of dynamism 
in China’s capital accumulation, which sustains a high level of productive investment, 
but is also a source of overaccumulation. Competition promotes duplication of 
investment across provinces and the build-up of excess capacity, which has reached 
global proportions in a several manufacturing branches (Hung 2008). In addition to 
overaccumulation in the real economy, easy credits have also sustained property 
bubbles in China’s cities.2  
While the authorities in coastal regions were able to establish TVEs to earn 
extra-budgetary revenue, those in the interior or those located far from the cities 
were normally unable to do so. They were under strong pressure to engage in illicit 
activities in order to meet their targets (So 2007: 565-568, 579 note 11; Wong and 
Bird 2008: 438, 446-449). Under these conditions, even well-intended reforms by the 
central government might backfire. For example, it is likely that local governments 
expanded their illicit confiscation of farm land from the turn of the century to 
compensate for the losses of revenue that resulted from centrally imposed 
restrictions on rural taxation (Lee 2007: 259).  
Unlike Taiwan and South Korea, there have been marked, recent trends of 
‘primitive accumulation’ in China, as peasant ownership of land has become more 
contested in semi-urban areas. In November 2003, Chinese authorities reported 
more than 168,000 cases of illegal land seizures that year, which was twice as many 
as in the whole of the previous year. Estimates of the number of people who have 
lost their land, mainly as a result of urban expansion, vary between 40 and 66 
million. According to one estimate, 10 million of the dispossessed were unemployed 
(Erie 2007: 921; Christiansen and Zhang 2009: 9).  
Land has become more valuable than ever as cities sprawl and industrial and 
urban land use increases. Uncertain property rights and deficient land registration 
procedures facilitate land confiscation by local governments that lease the land to 
urban developers. On occasion, whole villages have been evicted from their land. 
Compensation is normally far below the value of the land after it has been converted 
for commercial purposes. Payment for land leases is a very important form of 
revenue for hard-pressed local governments with tight budgets, while control over 
land is a major source of patronage and corruption (So 2007: 570-571; Li 2009: 6-7; 
Christiansen and Zhang 2009: 9; Yep and Fong 2009: 70-73).  
 
Grievances and conflicts: pressure from below 
There have been numerous popular protests against exploitation, corruption, 
discrimination, unemployment, evictions and environmental degradation in China. 
The number of ‘mass disturbances’ registered by the Chinese authorities has been 
markedly growing since the early 1990s, including a sharp rise after the 1997 public 
enterprise reform, from 12,000 in 1996 to 40,000 in 2000. The number of registered 
incidents reached 83,600 in 2005. Since then the authorities stopped publishing 
figures. However, CCP sources cite figures of 127,467 incidents for 2008.3 The 
major riots and demonstrations that took place from the turn of the century to 2005 
were over issues of unpaid wages and pensions, irregular taxes, fees and tolls, land 
confiscation without proper compensation, pollution and corruption (Keidel 2006: 1-3; 
China Labour Bulletin 2009b: 6). More recently there have been large strikes, 
demonstrations and other actions by migrant workers.  
Political and social organizations that operate independently of the CCP are 
suppressed. Local elections are frequently controlled by elites, and key decisions are 
normally made by unaccountable officials at higher levels of government. Resistance 
is therefore mainly manifested at the local level through relatively spontaneous 
demonstrations, obstructions, strikes, petitions to higher-level government entities 
and, on rare occasions, court appeals (van Rooij 2009: 454-456). As noted by 
Vivienne Shue: 
Suffering state-sector workers and peasants have been prone to frame their 
protests in localized and limited ways, taking as their protest targets not the 
architects of central reform policy but local ‘bad’ officials, ‘incompetent’ firm 
managers, and ‘heartless’ employers.  
(Shue 2004: 29). 
 
Peasants view the state in bifurcated terms. The central government is seen as a 
‘benign’ authority. This vision has been further reinforced by Beijing’s initiatives since 
the turn of the century to restrict rural taxation and strengthen the legal protection of 
peasant landholdings. Local township governments are perceived as ‘malign’ 
because they impose heavy taxes and fees on poor inhabitants, and dispossess 
peasants of land (Guo 2001: 435-437; So 2007: 571-572). 
Workers also have a bifurcated view of the state. The benign character of 
central government is demonstrated by its promulgation of labour laws, while local 
officials are viewed as corrupt and unfit to rule because they do not enforce the laws. 
Most labour protests are targeted at enterprise managerial cadres and their 
superiors in local industrial or labour bureaus, while they petition higher level 
government officials (Lee 2007: 20-21).  
 
Reform from above 
Central government is concerned that local unrest will cause social and political 
instability. This has resulted in, ‘[a] partial, limited and elite-driven […] attempt to 
counter the unfettered market’s potentially destabilizing effects’ (Dong et al. 2010: 
32). As argued by Elizabeth Perry, social unrest has served as a substitute for more 
democratic forms of representation to induce social reform:  
Lacking elections and other democratic channels for conveying popular 
interests and grievances, protest in China provides valuable information to 
higher political authorities about pressing grassroots concerns. Furthermore, 
the issues that motivate widespread protests sometimes lead to substantive 
policy reform. The central government’s historic abolition of the 2,600-year-
old agricultural tax in January 2006… came in response to a raft of rural tax 
riots -- sparked by local officials’ imposition of ‘unfair burdens’ -- that had 
engulfed the inland provinces in the 1990s. Similarly, the newly enacted 
property rights law, which establishes villagers’ rights to the ownership and 
benefits of collective landholdings, is a reaction to the recent surge in violent 
land disputes -- triggered by the sales of village lands by local officials -- that 
have swept the coastal provinces. 
(Perry 2008: 214). 
 
Social reform policies were driven by a new political leadership. The ‘populist faction’ 
within the Politburo with careers from the poor interior areas of China strengthened 
its position after the turn of the century. It favoured policy measures to halt China’s 
growing inequality. President Hu Jintao and premier Wen Jiabao, who assumed 
office in 2003, are leading members of this faction, rivalling the ‘elitist faction’ from 
the coastal areas with close ties to China’s centres of foreign trade and finance 
(Hung 2009: 13-14).  
Central government also hopes to use the reforms to change China’s model of 
accumulation. Inequality is an obstacle to the transition of China’s growth model from 
reliance on exports and investment to greater emphasis on domestic consumption. 
Consumption is constrained by the high level of saving in the Chinese economy. 
China’s share of savings in GDP is one of the highest in the world and 
correspondingly, the share of consumption in GDP is among the lowest. Social 
inequality and reduced welfare lead to a low level of consumption and a high level of 
saving. High-income groups save relatively larger proportions of their income than 
low-income groups, and welfare cuts have resulted in a rise in the households’ 
propensity to save to cover future costs. Inequality is also indicated by the strong 
growth of corporate profits relative to wages in GDP. Corporate saving has 
expanded in proportion with the rise in corporate income (Ma and Wang 2010). The 
government has responded with policies to boost consumption and reduce 
inequality. 
By the late 1990s, the Chinese government had already initiated a Western 
development strategy (‘Go West’) in response to the Asian financial crisis. The 
government increased its investment in infrastructure programmes in the poor 
western provinces. Investors were encouraged by preferential tax policies, and the 
banks were directed to increase their lending to the regions (Fan et al. 2010: 9-10; 
Lu and Deng 2011). These policies were given a new boost with the onset of the 
international financial crisis in 2008. The government responded with a fiscal 
stimulus package, which mostly was allocated to large infrastructure investments in 
interior regions. 
Since 2002, the central government has developed various national welfare 
programmes that have become increasingly comprehensive, including basic health 
insurance for urban residents, the re-establishment of the Cooperative Medical 
System in rural areas, free and compulsory nine years of schooling for all, rural 
minimum income guarantees, social insurance and pensions for migrant workers and 
housing for the urban poor (Wang 2008). In 2005, the National People’s Congress 
adopted the ‘harmonious society’ slogan, marking a reorientation from economic 
growth to overall societal balance and harmony. This went along with a programme 
to ‘rebalance’ China’s economy with policies aimed at expanding domestic 
consumption markets and improve living conditions in the countryside and in poor 
provinces (Lardy 2007).  
Rural reform and labour rights are parts of this effort to reduce inequality and 
support consumption. In 2006, the government abandoned all agricultural taxes, and 
in the same year established a Land Superintendency tasked with ensuring that 
farmland confiscated by local authorities was sold at market prices and that 
compensation was based on its commercial value. In October 2008, the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party adopted a major land reform programme in 
which peasants will have the right to transfer, subcontract or lease land use rights 
and to use their land as collateral in lending. Additionally, the supply of farming 
credits will be increased and improved. The intention is to create larger, more 
productive land holdings and increase agricultural investment while the rural surplus 
population is to be employed within services industries in small and medium sized 
cities and receive universal welfare rights (Fabre 2009: 12-13; Li 2009: 7-8).  
Although most of the social policies are designed for either rural or urban 
residents, not the migrant population, the government has introduced a compulsory 
social insurance scheme for migrant workers which includes pensions, injury 
compensation, maternity leave, medical care and unemployment pension. However, 
this insurance system is only available to workers with written labour contracts. In 
2008, a labour contract law made long-term written labour contracts mandatory. In 
addition, there were also new laws concerned with labour dispute arbitration and 
employment promotion in 2008 (Ho 2009; Wang et al. 2009; Chan et al. 2010). The 
government’s reform programmes look impressive. Implementation, however, is 
difficult and there is considerable resistance.  
 
Limits to reform from above 
As indicated above, China’s rural reforms will both strengthen the property rights of 
farmers and facilitate the commercialization of land. It is, however, far from certain 
whether the central government will succeed in protecting peasant land. Land titles 
in China are highly uncertain and there is no independent judiciary. Moreover, it is 
the local authorities, the main beneficiaries of land confiscations, which are 
responsible for interpreting and implementing land laws, assessing land value and 
providing the relevant documents that give peasants the right to the land.  
Additionally, if reform actually succeeds, it will probably create new rural 
inequalities with concentration of land and proletarization. Labour migration from the 
countryside to towns and cities is then likely to increase and in turn, rural migrants 
will be employed in urban services and receive welfare benefits. Thus these 
measures are expected to raise consumption, and the hukou residential system will 
then have to be reformed or abolished (Fabre 2009: 14; Li 2009: 11, 12, 17).  
Hukou reform has been on the national political agenda since 2001, but with 
limited effect. An initiative to extend urban hukou rights to groups with stable urban 
residence and income by 2006 has not been implemented. In 2005, central 
government launched an initiative to replace the distinction between urban and rural 
hukou with a new distinction between permanent and temporal residency. This 
reclassification has only been implemented in part. There is strong resistance from 
central government ministries and many local governments that fear increased public 
expenditure on welfare. Hukou reclassification has also been a counter reform to 
many farmers in semi-urban areas, having lost the rural subsidies and collective 
land-use rights that were associated with their rural hukou, thus becoming more 
vulnerable to confiscation by local governments (Wang 2010: 342, 350-351).  
As for labour reforms, employers have applied various strategies to evade 
mandatory labour contracts. Workers have been pressurized to sign contracts in 
which the contract terms are not disclosed, or forced to resign before they can be 
rehired, thus losing seniority rights. ‘New’ companies have been set up in which 
workers have been hired on new terms. The use of part-time labour has increased 
as it entails few contractual responsibilities. Many employers have increased their 
use of dispatch labour from employment bureaus to avoid contractual responsibility. 
The labour contract law has therefore indirectly increased labour market dualism 
between regulated employment in the formal sector and unregulated employment in 
the informal sector by labour bureaus and subcontractors (China Labour Bulletin 
2009a: 18-19; Ho 2009: 93-94; Wang et al. 2009: 491-494; Zhang 2010: 4-5; Chan 
et al. 2010: 51).  
  Much of the resistance to central government’s reforms come from local 
governments that have strong inducements to prioritize accumulation over 
legitimation. As has been argued above, local governments’ illegal taxation, land 
confiscation and preferential treatment of business are structurally rooted in the tight 
revenue constraints that have been imposed on them by central government. This 
goes hand in hand with the centrally imposed system of cadre evaluation, which 
induces local cadres to maximize economic growth and revenue. For Beijing, this is 
a comfortable situation. Its legitimacy is strengthened by its removed position, while 
local governments serve as lightning rods. The reforms may, however, falter without 
a thorough redress of relations between central and local governments.  
The cadre evaluation system uses social order and political stability, as 
measured by the absence of mass incidents as a performance criterion (Zhang 
2010: 6). Local cadres are therefore vulnerable to unrest. Their support of 
accumulation to generate revenue must be balanced with some degree of stability 
and legitimacy. Thus, a survey of labour conflicts 2007-08 by the China Labour 
Bulletin indicate that government officials frequently stepped in at the early stages of 
a labour dispute in order to mediate and avoid escalation while also partly 
addressing the workers’ grievances. For example, it was common to compensate for 
least some part of outstanding wages in cases where the employer had disappeared 
(China Labour Bulletin 2009a: 42). 
Nevertheless, central government’s attempt to promote reform in a setting 
where local governments are at best are lukewarm about the reforms is vulnerable. It 
is likely that reform ‘from above’ will require some support ‘from below’ from groups 
outside the local party state that benefit from the reforms. Feedback from workers, 
farmers, urban dwellers and others is needed to monitor non-implementation or 
violation of central government’s reforms, and to improve upon them. This will 
require collective organization with some degree of autonomy from the local state-
party-business nexus. Tendencies in this direction are seen within China’s labour 
relations.  
 
Labour reform from above and the mobilization of workers from below 
There are differing assessments of the power of labour in China. Ching Kwan Lee is 
relatively pessimistic in her study of workers in state-owned enterprises in China’s 
northeast ‘rustbelt’ and migrant workers in the ‘sunbelt’ in the south. She argues that 
labour mobilization is frequently strong within work units, while broader labour 
activism across work units is constrained by official suppression and the 
segmentation of workers. Labour is isolated from alliances with other classes or civil 
society associations and has to contend with a strong alliance between government 
and business. And thus workers must put their trust in a legal system that is biased 
towards their employers (Lee 2007).  
Beverly Silver and Lu Zhang are more positive about the strength of Chinese 
labour. Silver has previously argued that international relocation of major sectors of 
manufacturing such as automobile production, has induced defensive ‘Polanyi-type’ 
labour activism in old ‘sunset’ centres of production (comparable to Lee’s ‘rustbelt’) 
aimed at resisting redundancies and declining standards of living that threaten 
customary livelihoods. Expansion in new ‘sunrise’ manufacturing centres 
(comparable to Lee’s ‘sunbelt’) has gone hand in hand with assertive ‘Marx-type’ 
labour activism, which is oriented to improving working conditions and wages. 
Sunrise capitalists are forced to make concessions to their workers and wages are 
increased. Eventually, production is relocated and the cycle is repeated (Silver 
2003). Silver and Zhang regard Chinese labour activism in the late 1990s as mostly 
defensive, Polanyi-type sunset area responses in state-owned enterprises. Labour 
conflicts since 2004 are seen as assertive, Marx-type activism within new sunrise 
centres of manufacturing along the coast (Silver and Zhang 2009: 175).  
Labour shortage has played a significant role in empowering China’s workers. 
As argued earlier, the period from the mid-1990s until 2002 was characterized by 
declining employment within manufacturing. Manufacturing employment began to 
rise again after 2002 from 101 million by yearend 2002 to 113 million by yearend 
2006 (Banister and Cook 2011: 41).  
The inflow of foreign direct investment since China joined the WTO in 2001 
led to increased demand for manufacturing labour in coastal areas of China. 
Meanwhile, the central government and some local governments initiated policies to 
raise farm income through tax reductions and subsidies. These policies, along with 
the coming of age of China’s one-child generation (introduced in 1978), reduced 
labour migration from the countryside. The average nominal hourly wages of workers 
within manufacturing doubled in 2002-08. Real wage increase was limited by 
inflation, but there were still a significant increases (Banister and Cook 2011: 45, 49; 
Hui 2011: 140).  
The implementation of the labour contract and labour arbitration laws in 2008 
coincided with a sharp drop in employment due to domestic problems and the 
international financial crisis. Manufacturing employment fell to from 113 million in 
2006 to 97 million in 2007 and stood at 99 million by yearend 2008. The number of 
labour arbitration cases rose from 350,000 in 2007 to 693,000 in 2008, while the 
number of workers involved increased from 650,000 to 1.2 million. Labour-related 
law suits nearly doubled (China Labour Bulletin 2009a: 14; Banister and Cook 2011: 
41).  
Arbitration councils and courts frequently favour employers. Local authorities 
in China’s sunbelt have, however, been strict in enforcing the labour laws. The city 
governments of Shenzhen, Guangzhou and other export manufacturing centres in 
the Pearl River Delta have adjusted their industrial policies to promote high-tech, 
value-added production. They wish to dispense with labour-intensive, low value-
added manufacturing production that faces tough competition from low-wage 
countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia. Low value-added manufacturing is also 
regarded as a cause of public disorder due to the extensive use of migrant labour. 
Stricter law enforcement has given workers more leverage to push their demands. 
Low value-added manufacturing is relocated to the interior of China or abroad. 
Relocation to the interior benefits from investment support under the central 
government’s ‘Go West policy’ (Ho 2009: 88).  
In November 2008, the government introduced a major stimulus package 
oriented to infrastructure investment and domestic demand that was quite successful 
in seeing China through the crisis.4 The government also introduced a freeze on 
minimum wages in response to the financial crisis. China’s economy began to 
recover during the third quarter of 2009 and manufacturing employment grew. The 
government’s extensive support to the interior of China through the stimulus package 
created new local job opportunities that reduced labour migration to the coast, which 
has resulted in a shortage of skilled and semi-skilled workers in China’s coastal 
export centres (Hui 2011: 140). From the second half of 2010, local governments 
began to raise minimum wages. The 12th Five-Year Plan of October 2010 stated as 
one of its objectives that the share of consumption in output should grow and that 
labour income should increase at least as fast as labour productivity. According to 
the government’s employment market plan of February 2012, minimum wages 
should grow at least 13 per cent every year until 2015 (China Labour Bulletin 2011: 
6-7; Hui 2011: 141; Naughton 2011: 3; China News Center 2012). 
The minimum wage increases of 2010 came after a wave of labour conflicts in 
the manufacturing centres in the South. The China Labour Bulletin suggests that 
central government was favourably inclined to this pressure from below, as its 
project of boosting wages faced stiff resistance from employers (China Labour 
Bulletin 2011: 35).  
  A new generation of migrant workers has emerged that are more assertive 
than their parents. Many of them work under poor conditions, but high-skilled, 
relatively well paid-workers have also taken part in collective labour conflicts. In May 
2010, more than 1800 workers at the Nanhai Honda component factory went on 
strike. This was followed by strikes in another Honda component factory and several 
other automakers. The Nanhai Honda strike lasted for two weeks and was costing 
the company up to 2.4 billion RMB (about USD 350 million) a day. The Honda 
strikers claimed that the enterprise branch of the official All-China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) had sided with management and demanded that trade union 
representatives should be elected. Eventually, ACFTU members used violence 
against the strikers (Estlund and Gurgel 2011: 19-21; Hui 2011: 137-138).  
The Nandai Honda strike was a Marx-type labour action, which was oriented 
to offensive economic interests and which succeeded in obtaining a significant wage 
increase. The strike was followed by a public debate about the purpose and role of 
the ACFTU, the only officially recognized trade union in China. It was originally 
based in China’s SOEs, but over the past years it has worked to unionize the private 
sector. The union is controlled by the CCP and its officials are normally chosen from 
the Party. Officials within enterprises are normally unelected and financed by the 
enterprise themselves, and are frequently recruited from management. Thus, the 
ACFTU within enterprises typically serves the management, while its hierarchy 
outside the enterprises serves the CCP (Estlund and Gurgel 2011: 26-28, 37).  
In July 2010, the Executive Committee of the ACFTU adopted several 
resolutions on ‘further enhancing enterprise trade union work’, including resolutions 
about democratic intra-enterprise elections of trade union chairs within enterprises 
and collective bargaining. This may be seen as an attempt to win back territory after 
the Nanhai Honda strike. Moreover, there have been experiments with (limited) 
forms of union elections and collective bargaining in the ‘liberal’ provinces 
Guangdong and Zhejiang over the past few years (Estlund and Gurgel 2011: 25-26, 
45-46, 49-51).  
The ACFTU and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security are 
promoting a form of tripartite relations, although initiative is restricted by political 
authoritarianism. Significantly, government officials use the term ‘collective 
consultation’ rather than ‘collective bargaining’. It is an open question how far the 
‘liberal’, rich coastal provinces will go towards real interest representation by labour, 
and how many strings will be attached. It is also remains likely that the gap between 
the labour regimes of these provinces and the provinces in the interior of China will 
grow as the latter become hosts to China’s sweatshops. The ongoing changes in 
China’s internal manufacturing product cycle and division of labour will then be 
accompanied by diverging labour regimes.  
 
Concluding remarks 
I have argued that the inequality and destabilization caused by China’s market 
reforms have forced the central government to undertake social reform to stabilize 
the political and social order and reorient China’s model of accumulation. Social 
reform from above by central government is, however, a highly contradictory 
process, as China’s growth dynamic has to a large extent been based on the 
devolution of political power to local governments and strong alliances between local 
governments and business. Local governments and business will frequently oppose, 
stall or distort the implementation of central government’s social reforms. I have 
discussed labour relations in order to indicate how this stalemate might yet be 
interrupted through popular protest and mobilization from below. To some extent, 
reform from above and popular mobilization from below may reinforce one another, 
but there is a long way to go. Mobilization from below is restricted by China’s 
authoritarian order, while uneven capitalist development creates differing regional 
conditions for empowerment and mobilization. 
 
 
  
Notes 
 
                                                 
1 Before 1998, children inherited their mother’s hukou, thereafter they could inherit the hukou of either 
of their parents. When both parents have a rural hukou, their children will still be deprived of urban 
hukou rights. 
2 At the time of writing of this chapter (February 2012), it is widely argued that these bubbles are 
about to burst. Some fear that property prices in China’s major cities will collapse. 
3 It should be added that the figures are unreliable due to the vague definition of ‘mass disturbance’ as 
‘any kind of planned or impromptu gathering that forms because of “internal contradictions”, including 
mass public speeches, physical conflicts, airing of grievances or other forms of group behaviour that 
may disrupt social stability.’ See Freeman (2010).  
4 The stimulus package entailed large credit creation, which reinforced China’s problems of 
overaccumulation. More recently the central bank has attempted to tighten monetary policies to deal 
with these problems.  
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